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Cognitive Biases and Design Research: Using insights
from behavioral economics and cognitive psychology to
re-evaluate design research methods
Nikki Pfarr, Institute of Design, Illinois Institute of Technology, nikki@id.iit.edu
Judith Gregory, Institute of Design, Illinois Institute of Technology, judithg@id.iit.edu

Abstract
In light of well-established principles in behavioral economics and cognitive psychology,
we consider how minor variants in the structure, framing, and phrasing of several
common design research activities may unintentionally elicit more biased participant
responses than currently recognized. To begin investigating the relationship between
minor modifications to design research activities and changes in participant responses,
we propose designs for three experiments, and then explore their weaknesses and
limitations through a short-term pilot study.
In our discussion, we suggest that a better understanding of cognitive biases may be
used to produce more accurate and salient participant responses – either by minimizing
or by explicitly eliciting activity- and context-induced biases as appropriate to the
research at hand. Additionally, we propose that recognition of context-dependent
preferences could lead to more holistic models of user behavior.
This early research is a work in progress. The principle aim of this paper is to provide a
conceptual foundation for additional research into how participants’ cognitive biases
might influence the outcome of design research activities, and related implications for
research activity design.
Keywords
Design methods; Cross, trans, inter, multi-disciplinarity; Cognition; Behavioral
economics; Cognitive biases
Seemingly irrational behavior is pervasive in everyday decision making. People routinely
make decisions that are not in their own best interests: they fail to participate in
company-matching 401(k) programs despite being essentially offered free money; they
smoke despite knowing the long-term risks of lung cancer; and they volunteer to work for
free.
As design researchers, we strive to develop holistic models of human behavior within
specific domains. Our models, and the methods by which we seek to discover,
challenge, and extend them, will be most effective if they take into account both the
conscious and unconscious ‘irrational’ behaviors people exhibit daily.
The field of behavioral economics, which draws upon both classic and contemporary
cognitive psychology, offers substantial experimental data that help explain the ways in
which irrational decision making is influenced by seemingly minor and irrelevant factors
(see Rabin, 1998).

Literature review
Judgmental heuristics
Psychologists Tversky and Kahneman1 (1974) proposed that irrational decision making
can be partially understood in terms of judgemental heuristics and the cognitive biases
to which they lead. Judgmental heuristics are the mental shortcuts that help our brains
process information and quickly make decisions. Without these heuristics, we would be
faced with the insurmountable task of evaluating every small piece of information we
encounter every second of every day.
In particular, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) identified three heuristics commonly used to
estimate probabilities and values: representativeness, availability, and adjustment and
anchoring. Representativeness is defined as assessing the likelihood that a person or
item belongs to a particular group based on how closely it aligns with one’s existing
understanding of that group; such assessment often involves drawing upon stereotypes.
Availability is defined as estimating the frequency or probability of an event based on
how easily examples of the event come to mind. Examples that are particularly visceral
or salient are more likely to stand out, thus causing people to overestimate the frequency
of their occurrence. Adjustment and anchoring is defined as estimating a probability or
amount by starting from an initial reference point and then making adjustments in the
direction that seems most appropriate.
Judgemental heuristics enable us to function efficiently in the face of large amounts of
information and stimuli. However, reliance on these shortcuts can lead to systematic
cognitive biases, i.e., tendencies to evaluate information, exhibit behaviors, and make
decisions in consistently biased ways.
Cognitive biases and common behavioral tendencies
Substantial work in behavioral economics and cognitive psychology has been devoted to
exploring, challenging, and uncovering the scope of cognitive biases, including those
that stem from judgemental heuristics (see Rabin, 1998). Many of these findings suggest
that what people think they like, need, and want – topics particularly relevant to design
research – is often influenced by the way their options are framed.
Previous studies, such as those discussed below, have focused on the application of this
knowledge to the domains of market research, consumer decision making, and product
appraisal. However, we argue that there is greater relevance to the larger domain of
design research: cognitive biases not only provide insight into participants' decisionmaking behavior, they can inform how we attempt to elicit and understand participants'
preferences.
The following overview is organized around seven behavioral tendencies, selected
because they have been widely circulated in behavioral economics discussions and
because they are particularly relevant to design research. These tendencies are
summarized in Table 1.

1

Kahneman was awarded the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economics for his contributions to the
field (Nobel Foundation).

Behavioral Tendency

Description

Sources

Loss Aversion

Tendency to avoid options that
result in a loss relative to one’s
current reference point, and to
perceive losses as more
impactful than gains of equal
value

Kahneman & Tversky (1979);
Tversky & Kahneman (1991);
McNeil, Pauker, Sox &
Tversky (1982); Tversky &
Kahneman (1986);
Wertenbroch & Dhar (2000)

Endowment Effect

Tendency to attribute
increased value to an owned
item or entity

Thaler (1980); Kahneman,
Knetsch & Thaler (1990);

Status Quo Bias

Tendency to select a default
option when one is present

Samuelson & Zeckhauser
(1988); Madrian & Shea
(2001)

Affective Forecasting
Error

Tendency to inaccurately
predict future emotional states

Loewenstein & Schkade
(1999); Simonson (1990);
Gilbert et al. (1998);
Loewenstein (1996)

Context-Dependent
Preferences

Tendency to change one’s
preferences based on context,
including how many options
are being compared and the
nature of their comparison
(joint or separate)

Simonson & Tversky (1992);
Tversky & Simonson (1993);
Hsee & LeClerc (1998)

Affective-Cognitive
Decision Making

Tendency to be more
influenced by affective
reactions than cognitive
reactions when cognitive
resources are limited

Shiv & Fedorikhin (1999)

Introspection and
Consideration
Override

Tendency to alter one’s
preferences when prompted to
analyze them

Wilson & Schooler (1991);
Amir & Ariely (2007)

Table 1 Summary of relevant behavioral tendencies

Loss Aversion: Is it a loss or a gain?
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) found that the framing of decisions, prospects, and
possible outcomes influences the way people make decisions. People tend to evaluate
options in terms of whether they result in a loss or a gain relative to a starting reference
point. Losses are seen as being more impactful than gains of equal value, and as such

people tend to avoid outcomes that involve loss. This behavioral tendency is known as
loss aversion (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991).
Typically, people do not fully consider a given option in terms of both potential loss and
potential gain; instead they generally accept the loss or gain frame in which the option is
initially presented. Framing the same option in terms of a loss or a gain has been found
to substantially change the perception of its desirability (McNeil, Pauker, Sox, & Tversky,
1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). For example, McNeil et al. (1982) found that framing
the same medical treatment option in terms of probability of living versus probability of
dying substantially affected the perceived attractiveness of that option relative to other
treatment options.
The hedonic versus utilitarian nature of an item can impact the degree of loss aversion.
Wertenbroch and Dhar (2000) found that, when choosing to acquire either a hedonic
item (like an apartment with a nice view) or a utilitarian item (like an apartment with a
short commute to work), people usually choose to acquire the utilitarian item. But when
choosing to give up a hedonic item or a utilitarian item, people usually choose to give up
the utilitarian item.
The Endowment Effect: Is ownership involved?
Thaler (1980) identified the endowment effect, related to loss aversion, in which the
sense of loss associated with giving up an item is greater than the sense of gain
associated with receiving the same item; ownership increases the perception of value.
Aligned with this concept, Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990) found that the seller of
an item is more likely to ask for a price that is higher than a buyer would otherwise offer
to pay.
The Status Quo Bias: Is there a default choice?
Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) identified the status quo bias, in which people
overwhelmingly tend to select a default option when one is available. For example,
Madrian and Shea (2001) found that 401(k) plan enrollment substantially increases
when enrollment is the default option.
Affective Forecasting Error: Are participants attempting to predict their future
emotions?
Numerous experiments have found that people’s predictions of their future emotional
states tend to be inaccurate, even in the short term (for an overview, see Loewenstein
and Schkade, 1999). For example, Simonson (1990) found that when people make longterm decisions, they tend to favor more variety than they actually want when the future
outcome occurs. Specifically, when people purchase several items in advance and
consume them over time, they tend to seek more variety than when they purchase items
with the intention of immediately consuming them. Gilbert et al. (1998) found that people
tend to “overestimate the duration of their affective reactions to negative events” (p. 617)
that might occur in the future, for example, a romantic breakup or the death of a child.
Loewenstein (1996) found that, when in a “cold” state, people have difficulty predicting
their feelings in a “hot” state (such as hunger or sexual arousal).

Context-Dependent Preferences: How many options are there?
Several experiments indicate that the number of options present in a decision-making
scenario can influence preference. Simonson and Tversky (1992) found that
intermediate options, in general, are most appealing; people tend to exhibit extremeness
aversion. In another study, Tversky and Simonson (1993) found that, when selecting
between two options, the introduction of a third option can greatly influence the way the
original two options are perceived in comparison, and can even cause a reversal of
preferences relative to the original two options. Additionally, Hsee and LeClerc (1998)
found that comparing two attractive items in a joint evaluation decreases their overall
attractiveness, whereas comparing two unattractive items in a joint evaluation increases
their overall attractiveness.
Affective-Cognitive Decision Making: Are cognitive resources limited?
Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) found that when cognitive resources are limited, people are
more likely to be influenced by their affective rather than cognitive reactions when
making a decision. Specifically, they conducted an experiment in which participants were
told to memorize either a two-digit number (low cognitive load) or a seven-digit number
(high cognitive load), and then walk to a different room and tell the number to another
researcher. While walking to the other room and keeping the number in mind,
participants were asked to select a snack, either fruit salad or chocolate cake, that they
would receive for having participated in the study. Participants with the higher cognitive
load were much more likely to select chocolate cake over fruit salad; they were more
likely to be influenced by their affective reactions because their cognitive resources were
limited.
Introspection and Consideration Override: Are participants being asked to analyze
their preferences?
Numerous findings suggest that what people think they like, need, or want can change
depending on whether or not they are instructed to analyze their preferences. In most
cases this appears to result in more rational decision making, by overriding cognitive
biases like loss aversion. For example, Amir and Ariely (2007) found that people tend to
exhibit inconsistent preferences when primed to think about the pleasure (gain)
associated with an option, versus the payment (loss) associated with an option – but
when participants are asked to carefully consider their preferences, that inconsistency is
reduced. This concept is referred to as consideration override.
But heightened rationality may not always result in optimal decision making. Wilson and
Schooler (1991) found that asking people to analyze their preferences for strawberry
jams caused “them to base their subsequent choices on [non-optimal] criteria” (p. 181),
thus resulting in less optimal choices, compared to those of an expert. This suggests the
possibility that people are not always aware of the motivations for their preferences, and
that asking them to analyze those preferences may result in post-rationalization that
causes the initial preferences to change.

Implications for design research
In light of these and similar findings, it is possible that minor variants in the structure,
framing, and phrasing of design research activities may unintentionally elicit more biased
participant responses than currently recognized. In particular, design research activities

that require participants to make and analyze preference decisions should be
thoughtfully examined with an eye toward the cognitive biases they might unintentionally
induce.
In the next section, we evaluate three design research activities through the lens of
behavioral economics and cognitive psychology. In the following section, we propose
experiments to test the implications of our evaluations. Finally, we discuss insights into
the challenges and limitations of the experiment design, which were identified during a
short-term pilot study.

Evaluating three design research activities
We set out to evaluate the following design research activities through the lens of
behavioral economics and cognitive psychology:
1. A product comparison task, in which participants indicate which product they
prefer;
2. A feature selection task, in which participants construct a set of desirable product
features from a provided list of possible features;
3. A storytelling task, in which participants tell stories about previous life
experiences.
In this evaluation we identified three concepts from behavioral economics as particularly
relevant: context-dependent preferences, loss aversion, and anchoring and availability
(see Literature Review).
Evaluation of research activity 1: A product comparison task
Consider a design research activity related to product comparison in which participants
face a set of items to compare and are asked to indicate their preference. Such a
scenario may occur as part of a structured activity, for example during a lab-based
prototype test, or more informally, for example during a shop-along in which participants
decide which items to purchase.
Two behavioral tendencies discussed in the literature review are particularly relevant to
such an activity: context-dependent preferences and extremeness aversion. Previous
research related to these tendencies (Simonson & Tversky, 1992; Tversky & Simonson,
1993) leads us to believe that the number of items being compared in a product
comparison task may substantially impact a participant’s preferences. Specifically, we
hypothesize that in a three-item product comparison, participants will be more likely to
express a preference for the intermediate option than when that same option is included
in a two-item comparison.
Evaluation of research activity 2: A feature selection task
Consider design research tasks in which participants are asked to indicate which
features they like most from a provided set of features. The activity could easily be
framed as a gain ("Which features would you keep?") or as a loss ("Which features
would you get rid of?").
Loss aversion, a behavioral tendency discussed in the literature review, is particularly
relevant to such an activity. Previous research on loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky,

1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991) leads us to believe that framing a feature selection
task as a loss may result in fewer items being selected for removal because participants
attempt to avoid losses. Specifically, we hypothesize that framing a feature selection
task as a loss will result in a larger set of desired features than when the task is framed
as a gain.
Evaluation of research activity 3: A storytelling task
Consider design research scenarios in which participants are prompted to relate
personal stories. This commonly occurs during contextual and ethnographic interviews.
Availability, a judgmental heuristic discussed in the literature review, is particularly
relevant to storytelling activities. Previous research on availability (Tversky & Kahneman,
1974) leads us to believe that design research activities requiring a participant to tell a
story could increase the participant’s perception of the story’s saliency, particularly if the
story involves hedonic or visceral elements. Storytelling activities might increase the
availability of the recounted and similar memories, thus affecting the participant’s
perception of the probability of similar events occurring. We hypothesize that storytelling
could act as an inadvertent form of priming – that anecdotes brought up during
storytelling have heightened saliency, and therefore may influence participant responses
during subsequent research activities.

Experiment design
Following the evaluation of the three design research activities above, three experiments
w ere developed as a first step in exploring how minor variations in framing, phrasing,
and execution of these design research activities might lead to consistently biased
results. All three experiments were designed to be part of a hypothetical design research
study related to the iRobot Roomba, a robotic vacuum cleaner.
Design of experiment 1: Variations on a product comparison task
We hypothesized that in a three-item product comparison participants will be more likely
to express a preference for the intermediate option than when that same option is
included in a two-item comparison.
Thus, we propose an experiment in which half the participants engage in a two-item
comparison (Group A), while the other half engages in a three-item comparison (Group
B).
Participants in Group A will be presented with worksheets containing images and feature
descriptions of two robotic vacuum cleaners (see Figure 1) – a low-feature, low-price
product and a medium-feature, medium-price product – and asked to indicate their
preference. Participants in Group B will be presented with worksheets containing image
and feature descriptions of three robotic vacuum cleaners (see Figure 2) – the two
options presented to Group A plus a high-feature, high-price product – and asked to
indicate their preference.

Figure 1 Product comparison worksheet for Group A

Figure 2 Product comparison worksheet for Group B

Design of experiment for activity 2: Variations on a feature selection task
We hypothesized that framing a feature selection task as a loss will result in a larger set
of desired features than when the task is framed as a gain.
Thus, we propose an experiment in which half the participants engage in a feature
selection task framed as a loss (Group A), while the other half engages in a feature
selection task framed as a gain (Group B).
Participants in Group A will be presented with a set of 18 possible features for a robotic
vacuum cleaner and asked to remove the features they would not include in the final
design (the loss frame). Participants in Group B will be presented with the same 18
possible features and asked to select the features they would include in the final design
(the gain frame). Each participant will receive 18 strips of paper naming the features
along with a worksheet upon which to arrange them (see Figures 3, 4).

Figure 3 Feature selection worksheet for Group A (loss frame), showing a subset of features

Figure 4 Feature selection worksheet for Group B (gain frame), showing a subset of features

Design of experiment for activity 3: Variations on a storytelling task
We hypothesized that storytelling could act as an inadvertent form of priming – that
anecdotes brought up during storytelling have heightened saliency, and therefore may
influence participant responses during subsequent research activities.
Thus, we propose an experiment in which half the participants describe positive
memories indirectly related to a product (Group A), and the other half describe negative
memories indirectly related to the same product (Group B). All participants are then
asked to evaluate their interest in purchasing that product now or in the future.
Participants in Group A will be asked to recall and describe a time when their home was
clean and it made them happy (see Figure 7). Participants in Group B will be asked to
recall and describe a time when they had a frustrating experience with technology (see
Figure 8). All participants will then be asked to rate their interest in purchasing a robotic
vacuum cleaner now or in the future, on a scale of 1-5 (5 being most interested).

Figure 7 Storytelling and interest rating worksheets for Group A (positive story)

Figure 8 Storytelling and interest rating worksheet for Group B (negative story)

Note that in real one-on-one design research interviews, the storytelling prompts would
likely be less leading. For the purposes of this experiment, we specifically wanted to
compare the effect of a participant recalling and sharing a positive story versus a
negative story on his or her subsequent behavior and decisions.

Challenges and limitations identified during a pilot study
After designing the three experiments described above, the first author executed an
exploratory pilot study in November and December 2009. The primary aim of the pilot
study was to identify challenges and limitations related to the design and conduct of the
experiments, which could inform future work.
For the pilot study, ten Master’s of Design student participants (three males, seven
females) were recruited from the IIT Institute of Design. They were invited to participate
in a study about Roomba vacuum cleaners and were not aware that the study was
actually concerned with the evaluation of design research activities informed by
behavioral economics and cognitive psychology. Of the ten participants, three were
Roomba owners.
Pilot study sessions were conducted one-on-one (one participant with the first author as
facilitator). In each session, participants completed the three design experiments
described above2. The order of the activities remained consistent across all sessions.
While it may have been desirable to randomize the order in theory, the placement of the
storytelling activity could affect the outcome of the other activities in a session. The A/B
variation within each design research activity was randomly determined for an equal
distribution of the variations across participants.
Reporting on the pilot study is intended only as an exploratory foundation for additional
research in this area; given the small number of participants, the pilot study was not
intended to provide conclusive, robust or statistically significant results. Future studies
should be planned that feature revised and more extensive experiments, utilize a much
larger and more diverse sample, and are potentially double blind to prevent facilitator
behavior or knowledge of the experiment from influencing participant behavior.
While they are neither conclusive nor statistically significant, findings from pilot study
experiments are aligned with the initial hypotheses.
Reflecting on experiment 1: Variations on a product comparison task
In the pilot study, Group A (n=6) was presented with the two-product comparison, and
Group B (n=4)3 was presented with the three-product comparison. In Group A, two
participants selected the low-feature option, and four participants selected the mediumfeature option. In Group B, however, all four participants selected the medium-feature
option.
We recognize that special care needs to be taken when selecting the products and
features to be included in the product comparisons. For example, if one product appears
more utilitarian or hedonic than the others, or if one product evokes a sense of
ownership, preferences may be additionally impacted by loss aversion and the
endowment effect, respectively. While these would be interesting effects to consider in
the context of a product comparison activity, their presence in this particular experiment

2

In between the second and third experiments described above, pilot study participants
also completed a point distribution activity, which we do not discuss here due to space
limitations.
3

The 6-4 breakdown of participants, as opposed to a desired 5-5 breakdown, was the
result of human error during the random group assignment.

may make it difficult to evaluate the impact of changes to the number of products being
compared on participant preferences.
Additionally, during the pilot study participants referred to their current vacuum cleaners
and their budgetary constraints in relation to their preferences; these variables should be
controlled for in future studies.
Reflecting on experiment 2: Variations on a feature selection task
In the pilot study, Group A (n=5) was presented with the loss frame and Group B (n=5)
was presented with the gain frame. Out of 18 possible features, Group A produced a
feature inclusion set of average size 11.2, whereas Group B produced a feature
inclusion set of average size 8.8.
We recognize that participants’ starting reference points may be influenced by their
current vacuum cleaner in addition to the 18 product features presented. Removing a
feature may not only represent a loss relative to the starting set of 18 features, but a loss
relative to the features on their current vacuum cleaners, amplifying the overall sense of
loss. To better understand results from this experiment, information about participants’
current vacuum cleaners should be collected.
We also note that the type of features presented may affect participant preferences.
According to Wertenbroch and Dhar (2000), when people are faced with acquiring either
a utilitarian or hedonic item, they tend to select the utilitarian item. But when people are
faced with forfeiting either a utilitarian or hedonic item, they tend to keep the hedonic
item. As such, the hedonic/utilitarian nature of the features may impact preferences,
particularly as they relate to participants’ current vacuum cleaners.
Reflecting on experiment 3: Variations on a storytelling task
In the pilot study, each participant in Group A (n=5) was asked to recall a positive
memory whereas those in Group B (n=5) were asked to recall a negative memory.
Group A indicated an average interest rating of 4.3, whereas Group B indicated an
average interest rating of 3.1.
Moreover, non-owners’ interest ratings seemed to be more affected by the impact of
telling a negative story than those of Roomba owners. Of the non-owners, those who
told the positive story (n=4) indicated an average interest rating of 4.125, whereas those
who told the negative story (n=3) indicated an average interest rating of 2.5.
This may suggest that when an existing reference point is lacking, storytelling may have
greater influence on a participant’s behavior during subsequent research activities. This
may also be indicative of owners post-rationalizing their purchases, or attributing
increased value to the Roombas they already own (viz. the endowment effect). Current
Roomba ownership, then, would be an important factor to control for in future studies.
We also note that, while the storytelling worksheet for both groups in this experiment
provided a space for sketching a picture to go along with the story being told, only a few
participants made sketches. It’s possible that the act of sketching increases the saliency
of a story – and as such all participants in future experiments should be instructed either
to sketch or not to sketch along with their stories.

Discussion
As design researchers, we attempt to plan and conduct user research activities that help
us uncover participants’ underlying desires and latent needs. Given the prevalence of
cognitive biases, we need to carefully plan the tasks and contexts involved in design
research to understand how the structure and conduct of design research activities may
influence the ways participants perceive information, assess options, and ultimately
make decisions. We argue that small changes in design research activities may lead to
predictably biased participant responses, aligned with findings from behavioral
economics and cognitive psychology.
Failing to understand cognitive biases in the context of design research could lead to: (1)
inaccurate research findings because participants are being unintentionally and
unknowingly influenced into producing biased responses; (2) inappropriate
interpretations of research findings that fail to account for cognitive biases that may be
induced by the task or context at hand; or (3) inappropriate extrapolation of research
findings to other contexts without an understanding of how cognitive biases may change
across contexts.
An awareness and understanding of cognitive biases will allow design researchers to
better avoid unknowingly influencing participants in subtle and non-obvious ways via
activity- and context-induced biases. Changes in research techniques and activity design
may be necessary to produce more accurate participant responses. However, it is
natural to ask: is it possible, or even desirable, for design research activities to be truly
neutral? Is it possible for our research to avoid inducing any and all cognitive biases, in
favor of strictly rational decision making?
Given the directionality and intention of design projects, there likely does not exist a
design research activity that exerts no influence on participants, nor one that reveals
direct insight into a participant’s true preferences. But this should not discourage us.
Based on research from behavioral economics and cognitive psychology, it seems that
user preferences are not stable but rather that preferences change based on context,
framing, and the set of options being considered at a given time. Amir and Levav (2008)
propose that, rather than ever really deliberately constructing preferences, people often
“learn context-specific choice strategies without ever really engaging in difficult
subjective value assessment… they simply learn to repeatedly use contextual cues” (pp.
155-156).
Assuming that participant preferences are dynamic in nature, and both affect- and
context-sensitive, design research has an opportunity to explore the nuances of how a
preference changes across contexts. This might suggest a shift in the way we model
users’ preferences: rather than assuming that users have inherent preferences, we
should recognize and take advantage of the fact that users have dynamic and contextsensitive preferences.
Finally, a deeper understanding of cognitive biases could allow design researchers to
explicitly design research activities that induce certain biases, in order to mimic biases
present in other real-world scenarios or contexts. For example, when attempting to
understand preferences as they exist in the current marketplace, design research
activities should attempt to evoke the conditions of the marketplace. Given that
consumers' choices are affected by cognitive biases that may result in seemingly
‘irrational’ decisions, it would not be beneficial to artificially de-bias users during a design
research activity and then take those results as representative of real-world behavior.

Findings from behavioral economics may offer new insights into how to better replicate
and model participant decision making in real-world scenarios.

Conclusion
In this paper, we evaluated three common design research activities in light of
experimentally documented cognitive biases and judgemental heuristics. Whether or not
existing design research protocols could be improved given this knowledge, it will benefit
design researchers and designers to be informed about – and possibly participate in –
ongoing research in the realm of behavioral economics and decision making. Hopefully
this paper will spark additional discussion and research in this space.
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